

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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POLITICS OF FRANCE.

SIR,—If you think the fragments herewith inclosed worth the notice of the Public, you will much oblige one of your readers to insert them, or any part of them, in your Register. They are transcribed from the journal of a gentleman now travelling in France. The work itself is under the press, but not yet ready. Yours, &c. SWENSKA.*

France has the forests of Germany for the use of her dock-yards; with Holland, she acquires an extent of coast and a chain of sea-ports, which may enable her to raise a numerous navy in a few years.

It has been said, that the Consulate intends to raise an enormous navy, and to distribute it as follows: in the Mediterranean, France shall maintain 30
Spain - - - - - 20 } 65 sail of the line
The Italian states, including Naples - - 15 } of battle ships.

From Cadiz to the Texel,
France shall maintain 100 } 160 sail of the
Spain - - - - - 40 } line of battle
Holland - - - - - 20 } ships.

Should the French compose a navy in this manner, and oblige their allies to keep up 95 sail of the line for the service of the republic, the Dutch and Spanish officers and men will be under the immediate orders of their masters, the French. The inconvenience of separate commanders, which has so often frustrated the best combined plans of confederate forces, will thereby be avoided.

The heavy navies of France will not, however, soon be in a state to give much uneasiness to her rival neighbour. Should Buonaparté seriously set about building line of battle ships, Great-Britain may congratulate herself and let him go on. Lucky gamesters play boldly; but, when they meet with a few successive checks, they lose their clue, and become more disconcerted than others. The Consul has hitherto stalked high, and with remarkable success; should he attempt to pursue his fortune

upon the ocean, his preparations will be analogous to his usual measures; skirmishing is not in his tactics; if he send a fleet to sea, it will be such a fleet, as France never could boast of before; but if the spirit of the British nation do not entirely subside in the interval, that fleet will be beaten; every effort, which revenge can devise, will be made to augment its force, and it will be beaten again; its creator may then lose his temper, and France will lose her stake in the game.

The light *flotillas*, which the republic is preparing, may, perhaps, merit the attention of the British government, more than all the heavy navies of Europe and America together. It is certain, that at this moment, arrangements are making to form and repair such *depôts* and convenient harbours, between Brest and the Ems, where 1500 to 2000 light vessels may be kept in safety and constant readiness; to act either offensively, or to defend their own coast, as occasion may point out, or require: it is equally certain, that immense quantities of materials and stores, for the construction and equipment of these vessels, are already collecting from all quarters: and, there is no doubt, that the Consulate intends to extend this naval system of light squadrons to America and the West-Indies.

This statement of the natural and moral sources of France, are by no means exaggerated; the estimates we have given, are far under what an intelligent government might derive from the inexhaustible treasures of that overgrown empire. Fortunate, perhaps, it may be for the yet independent nations of Europe, that those sources of irresistible force are in the hands of Frenchmen!

Except when the personal characters of leading men, may, now and then influence the measures of a government, the politics of every state is, to secure its independence, augment its power, and elevate its rank. These objects cannot be pursued singly, they are interwoven with one another. The independence of a state can only be secured by an unremitted progression in power, of which rank is a consequence. Almost all

* For the interesting communications of our correspondent Swenska, we refer our readers to Vol. II. p. 119, 353, 342, 609. They will all be found highly important at the present juncture.

states have begun to decline, as soon as they ceased to rise. The ambition, avarice, and ignorance of individuals, allow nations no interval of stationary quiet and security.

In modern times, the only governments that seem to have acted upon any digested system, are the French since the commencement of the reign of Louis XIV. and the Russian since that of Peter I. These two monarchs felt the internal strength of their respective empires, and measured the powers of their neighbours.

When Louis assumed the direction of affairs, he found himself hemmed in, on the side of Germany, Italy and Spain, by Austria; and on all other sides, by Great-Britain and Holland. To break through that circumvallation, was an enterprize worthy of a young aspiring monarch; and as enterprizing princes generally do, he succeeded. By the valour of his arms, seconded by the infatuation and treachery of his neighbours, he levelled down all the bulwarks of his opponents; and laid Europe open to the inroads of France. He broke the power of Austria, and thereby destroyed the union and force of the German empire; he made Spain a province of his dominions; annihilated the arrogant and independent spirit of the Dutch*; and deprived Great-Britain of all her useful connexions on the continent of Europe†. His successors made

* The Dutch struggled long and bravely to consolidate the independence and political rank of their country; from 1709 to 1712, they believed they had succeeded; but one of those unforeseen fatalities, which, in a moment destroys the work of ages, blasted all their hopes. The change of system in the British Cabinet, or rather the change of men, (for it is not known to us, that ever a system was adopted there) produced the infamous treaty of Utrecht. The Dutch having spent immense treasures during the war, and obliged to abandon all the advantages they had acquired by it, their proud spirit of independence and ambition for military and naval glory, sunk into a sullen hatred towards Great-Britain. That hatred never diminished; on the contrary, the connexions between the houses of Brunswick and Nassau Orange, and our interference, sometimes by intrigue and sometimes by force, in favour of the Stadtholderate, made every Dutchman our inveterate enemy; and has, in the end, made Holland a department of France.

† Since the peace of Utrecht, Great-Britain has had for allies, Portugal, the Stadtholder, Hanover and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. In every continental war, these powers have been conquered by the arms of

but a poor use of the means he left at their disposal, it is true, but they adhered to the leading principle of his system; they kept fast hold of Spain; took all the measures, which a court like that of Versailles could be expected to devise, to weaken the House of Austria; to attach Holland to France, and undermine and divide the British empire. To direct the government of Spain, to subdue the Low countries, and to attach and secure Holland in the interests of France, were considered as the most effectual means to ruin the maritime trade and destroy the power of Great-Britain. These three objects were the principal articles in the political creed of the French monarchy. They are now accomplished! How far their effects may ultimately justify the calculations that have been made upon them, will depend upon the British cabinet. The result will, in all likelihood, be shortly seen.

The revolution has, in no wise altered the politics of France; it has changed the actors and they have adopted new measures. *But they are measures much more dangerous to the peace of the civilised world than those of their predecessors.* Instead of grovelling, in obscure intrigue, deceit and circumvention, the champions of the Republic have substituted a bold system of treachery, violence and military despotism. During the few years, that they have exercised the supreme authority, *the Republic has achieved all that Louis XIV. perhaps, ever intended;* France is raised to an eminence of power, which in that prince's time, would have made him as completely master of Europe, as he was of Alsace and Navarre. *The treaties of Luneville and AMIENS, have made the First Consul a more formidable potentate, than those of Utrecht and Rastadt made the chief of the House of Bourbon.*

However, although the Republic may certainly be considered, as completely mistress of the south-west-half of continental Europe, there is another power, of equal force, and perhaps of superior strength, that claims a similar dominion over the north and eastern-parts. We have before said, the political powers and military force of continental Europe, are divided between the governments of France and Russia. These two mighty empires, are come in contact: Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople, can only be considered as three neutral posts, situate in their line

France, and have been ransomed either by British money, or by British conquests; or retaken by other powers subsidised for that purpose; witness the surrender of our colonies at every peace, and our subsidies to Prussia, &c.

of demarcation. By the reduction of other states, the politics of Europe are much simplified; but that very circumstance renders the respective positions of the two dictatorial powers more critical. The intermediate field of their usual machinations is cleared, the slightest motion of the one, must now directly affect the other.

A free, independent and secure communication between the southern provinces of Russia and the Mediterranean, was an essential article in the fundamental system of the Czar Peter; it has been pursued, with more, or less energy, by all his successors; and, it is of such importance to the Russian empire that it can never be abandoned.

The navigation of the Black Sea, was a standing project in the politics of the French monarchy; it is now obtained, and to preserve it, is a consideration of the utmost consequence to the Republic. The Turkish government, sunk as it is, into a lethargic effeminacy, an open passage through the Archipelago and the Dardanelles, give to France, not only the direction of the trade and that empire, but what, to the consulate, is an object of infinitely greater importance, it lays open the only vulnerable part of the frontiers of Russia.

In the present state of things, can Russia and republican France go mutual sharers in the trade and government of the Turkish empire? This is by no means likely; nay, we may venture to say, it is impossible. Which of the parties then is to give up its pretension? The cabinet of Petersburg must certainly know, that should the Consulate be allowed to assume an ascendancy at Constantinople, or, to intermeddle in the affairs of Turkey, the fate of Moscow may again be disputed at Pultava! Will the present government of France retract and leave the Seraglio and St. Sophia to the desecration of Russians? In that case, a Cossack and Highland army, seconded by a Russian and British fleet, might yet confine the empire of Buonaparté to the government of his Gauls of the West. Or, can the ambition of Russia and the avarice of France be satisfied with a partial partition of Turkey? It is a known fact, that the Consul did propose to the court of Petersburg, to leave Moldavia, Walachia, Bessarabia, Bosnia and Servia, to the disposal of Russia and Austria, on condition that France might possess Candia, Negropont and other Greek islands in the Archipelago. But Russia, would as soon see France in possession of the canal of Constantinople and the Crimea, as suffer her to fix her feet on posts that might soon command the communication between

the Black and Mediterranean seas. Had the British ambassador arrived at Paris a few months sooner than he did, his Excellency could have informed Buonaparté, that Russia would not connive with France for the Turkish provinces north of the Danube. His lordship himself had the honour, as an agent, to sign away the property of those countries to the empress Catherine II. This monument of British shame was subscribed to by Sir Charles Whitworth, at Petersburg, on the 22d July, 1791. We hope it will not prove ominous!

Oczakow was not only the key to the northern provinces of Turkey, it was to Constantinople, what Bergen-op-Zoom and Maestricht formerly were to Amsterdam; and what the Pyrennees might yet be to Madrid. That post in the hands of Russia, to offer her the sovereignty of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia, was ridiculous enough.

The Russians at Akkirmann and Soroko, and the French, or their auxiliaries in Malta, the Sultan with his Seraglio have the comfortable prospect of very soon passing, either *au fil de l'épée, ou sous le knudt*, into the kingdom of Mahomet. It is remarkable, that when the Emperor of Turkey was obliged to surrender Oczakow, the King of England was mediator with 36 line of battle-ships armed, in his favour; and when Malta was ceded to be possessed by France, Great Britain was also an ally in co operation with Turkey. To propose an entire partition of the European dominions of the Turks, to whom give Thrace and Constantinople? Besides, Russia will never agree to a division that shall leave the Grecian islands to France. * Nor can it be expected that the Consulate will leave the Bosphorus to Russia.

Thus between these two governments matters seem to become nearly to a crisis. Considering the characters of each respec-

* Were the Chief Consul to admit, amongst the fractional parts of his political calculations, the value of the characters and abilities of the men he finds, here and there, at the head of the public affairs of other states, he might, perhaps, at this moment, be induced to possess himself of such posts and strong holds in the Levant, as would insure to the Republic at once, the dominion which she will otherwise have to fight for. Who knows but such is his design? We cannot however, presume, that those governments which are most immediately interested, can be so immersed in ignorance and lost to all sense of public duty and personal safety, as not to see through the perfidious manœuvres of the Consulate.

tively, and the powers and attitude of the two empires, if the Consul possess only half of those transcendent talents which his panegyrists are willing to allow him, he must certainly see, that their present cordiality cannot be of long duration. * And he is no doubt likewise aware that while Great Britain can powerfully interfere, to risk a quarrel with Russia would be imprudent and dangerous.

In this situation it appears to us, and indeed daily occurrences seem to confirm our opinion, that the plan of the Chief Consul is, to manage the Court of Petersburg until he disengage his rear; that is, *until he shall tie down the British Government to passive inactivity.*

To point out the measures by which the rulers of France intend to reduce the British Government to inaction, is here unnecessary; they are already plainly exhibited to the world. When the rest of Europe was beaten off the field, Buonaparté saw, that to fight with Great Britain alone, was an unprofitable trade; the archives of Versailles, furnished him with several striking examples: but in that same library, the General learned, that in a campaign of diplomatic negotiations, victory was certain; this was tried, and, *the Consulate make it no secret,*

* It is truly pitiful, to see public ministers and men charged with the defence of nations cajoling themselves in the hope, that Russia and France will quarrel and fight! Quarrel they certainly will; but when that event takes place, woe to their neighbours! While at peace, their mutual preponderance requires only dependency and obedience: at war their hostilities will impose upon the eastern continent, submission and slavery.

When the Czar and the Consul draw forth their legions in hostile array, mediation, armed coalitions, neutral conventions and *demarcation-lines*, will be of little avail. Those powers have long been unused to cabinet warfare, and to courtier *étiquette* in the field. The intervention of other states, may hasten their own subjection, but cannot ward off their fate. The chieftains of Russia and France will meet nearly on the centre of the world: the object of their quarrel will not be a bishoprick, a sugar island, nor who shall read their mass in Latin, or say their prayers in Greek: they will fight, for the possession of the *Hellespont* and *Bosphorus*, two posts on which hangs *now* suspended, the empire of our eastern hemisphere. Such contending parties will not come out to skirmish and then mutually retire; nor will they fight for conquests to give away; the one will keep the field,—and with it the dictatorship of the world.

that, the success far exceeded the most sanguine expectations. Since our continental alliances have been reduced to a few needy subsidiaries, the only means which we have had to check the ambitious projects of France, were, to keep the French colonies and trade under the guns of a preponderating navy. This check the Consul has not only removed, but he has also inverted the position. *The peace of Amiens has left the British colonies under the Guns of France; every passage to and from our possessions abroad is now flanked by posts already garrisoned, or to be garrisoned by the republic and her auxiliaries; and England herself is half encircled by the naval depôts and rising flotillas of her enemies.* Buonaparté considers Great Britain, as being reduced to the necessity of hereafter confining all her military and naval operations to the defence of her own dominions. * Abroad he has now no vulnerable point for us to attack; and our communication with the continent of Europe and Africa, depends immediately upon his will. These circumstances open to the republic, another advantage of a more serious nature, and which, the Consul believes, will lay open and expose to his tactics, *the very soul of the state; namely, the financial sources of the nation.*

(The remainder of this interesting article, containing Buonaparté's opinion on the Finances of England, will be given in our next.)

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Rome, Feb. 24.—There is talk here of a new French expedition against Algiers. In the treaty of the 17th Dec. 1801, the Dey promised to restore to France all the establishments on that coast, in the same condition in which they were previous to the year 1792; but he now refuses to give them back, unless he receives the old tribute.—The Republic of the Seven United Islands has sent a Minister Plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg (who has already arrived at Vienna). In these Islands a National Assembly (*Nazionale Consesso*) has been convoked to settle the internal regulations, relative to which Count Moncenigo and the President Teotochi have issued Proclamations.

Brest, March 5.—The effects of General Decaen, and of the officers belonging to the expedition to India, were yesterday embarked. They were themselves to go on board, and the fine weather will no doubt expedite their departure. The Captain-General Decaen, and Vice-Adm. Linois, embark in the *Marengo*. The ships employed in this expedition are crowded with a vast number of passengers. Transport vessels are expected

* No state, once reduced to fight in its own defence ever fought long. It is now about a century, that the military operations of Holland, Austria and Turkey have been confined to the defensive; and the warfare as well as the independence of these states, may be considered as having nearly ceased.

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from Bourdeaux and L'Orient, which are to sail soon after on the same destination.—*March 8.*—The expedition for India, which sailed in the afternoon of the day before yesterday, must have made a rapid progress in its voyage: for the wind, which was favourable, blew very fresh during that night and the whole of yesterday. The vessels that compose the expedition are, the *Marengo* of the line, the frigates *La Sémillante*, *L'Atalante*, *La Belle Poule*, and the transport *La Côte d'Or*. General Vander Mac Sen, Adjutant-General Binot, and the officers of the *Etat Major*, departed with General Decaen.

Basle, March 9.—The new Constitution of this country begins to be carried into execution. The Helvetic Senate dissolved itself on the 5th instant, and the dissolution of the Executive Council is fixed for this day.—Before it dissolved itself, the Senate passed a Decree, in which, after expressing generally their thanks to the First Consul, they declare, that they receive the Act of Mediation with gratitude; that all the Citizens of the Helvetic Republic are invited to conform to its dispositions, and to rally round Citizen D'Afry, the newly appointed Landamman of Switzerland; and that the Landamman Dolder is charged to communicate this Decree to Citizen D'Afry.

Hague, March 18.—A Courier from the First Consul, has brought dispatches, upon the receipt of which the sailing of the expedition for Louisiana was countermanded. The troops had already left their respective quarters to be embarked; they are now returning to them. Several battalions will be cantoned at Helvoet, and in the environs, where they will wait the ulterior dispositions of the French Government.—Frequent State Conferences are held; several couriers have been dispatched to different destinations; and orders have been sent to the Marine Council, and the War and Finance Departments. We hear that Admiral Hartsinck, who was to have relieved Admiral De Winter in the Mediterranean, will not sail with his squadron from our ports till it be decided whether peace will be preserved or not.—An English Messenger has brought dispatches for Mr. Liston, the British Minister, and is gone with important Dispatches to the Northern Courts.

Paris, March 14.—They write from Toulon, that the frigates *Le Rhin* and *La Cornélie*, were equipped on the 18th of February, to cruise before Algiers, and prevent the Corsairs of those Pirates from injuring our commerce. The frigate *La Mairon* is preparing to proceed to the same destination. It is known that the Dey of Algiers has given two months to the Agent of the Republic to quit the States. We are ignorant of the motives of such an insult.—By letters from Munich, dated the 5th of March, we learn, that the Emperor of Russia, having consented to the suppression of the Bavarian League, of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, its goods and possessions will be united to the domains of the Elector, by way of compensation for the loss of the Bishopric of Eichstett. The value of these goods is estimated at 5,700,000 florins, and the revenues at 171,000 florins.—The Government of the Republic decree, that the exportation of specie is prohibited till further orders.—The Consuls have issued a Decree, forbidding the exportation of any articles composed of gold or silver.—On the 5th inst. General Lasnes, Ambassador to Portugal, sailed from Rochelle for Lisbon, on board the frigate *La Themis*.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Proclamation addressed by Louis D'Afry, Landamman of Switzerland, to the Inhabitants of the Nineteen Confederated Cantons.

The First Consul of the French Republic has given an act of mediation which ought to terminate the dissensions, and fix the destiny of Switzerland. That important act, the result of long conferences with men of sagacity, and friends of civil order, is adapted to the wants and the dearest interests of a people, whom every thing invites to the pacific enjoyment of a stable and independent state of things.—Five years of broils and convulsions evinced the inconvenience of a Government exclusively central. The ancient federal system, modified by changes suited to the changes of our circumstances, and to the example of two neighbouring powers, could alone answer the wishes and situations of all the people of Switzerland.—Providence, the only support of just and virtuous Government, seems to have chosen, at this period, to terminate the ills afflicting our country, and to promise us felicity for the time to come. The new social compact must be executed; political divisions must, of course, cease; the passions must be constrained to silence. Only a wise unanimity of wills, a constant tendency to hinder private interests from interfering with that of the public, can give sure success to our new institutions; and only their success can confirm our independence.—It will belong to the Government of each Canton to form for itself laws suitable to the peculiarity of its local circumstances, and fitted to advance its prosperity. It is therefore of the greatest importance that, at the next elections, men should be chosen who are of tried probity, possessed of enlightened intelligence and experience, and thus capable of commanding that confidence which can alone give stability and vigour to the Government. Every man who loves his country will consult only the voice of his conscience, when he gives his suffrage, and will reject all advice contrary to that voice.—Such are the means which will enable us to restore to the Swiss nation that consideration which it once deservedly enjoyed, and to renew those days of peace and tranquillity of which we have so sensibly felt, and so long lamented the loss.—Given at Fribourg, March 10, 1803.—*Louis D'Afry.*

Landamman of Switzerland.

Proclamation of the Government of the Batavian Republic, relative to Trade and Navigation.

The Government of the Batavian Republic declares,—That having taken into consideration that the expiration of the charter of the Dutch East-India Company, and the changes occurred concerning the same, as also the restoration of almost all the possessions and establishments of this country in the East-Indies, had rendered it necessary to adopt new measures and regulations with regard to the trade and navigation to those ports; and the interests of the commercial world not admitting them to be deferred until the whole plan for the direction of the East-India possessions shall have been organized, it has been decreed and ordered to be made known:—That the navigation and trade from the ports of this Republic to Batavia, as also to the west of India, is free and open for all the inhabitants of the Batavian Republic, under the following stipulations:—That by the west of India is understood the Western Coast of the Island of Sumatra, together

with Melacca, and all countries and places situated to the westward of the said island, and as far south as the Cape of Good Hope.—That every description of goods and merchandize may be from hence sent thither, with the exception only of warlike stores, ammunition, and opium.—That the importation direct from India of all goods and merchandize coming from the westward of India, including Java sugar, and the article of tea only excepted, is permitted by the Dutch and foreign vessels, on paying the duties customary on importation.—That for the present the importation hither of goods from Batavia, by private Dutch individuals, shall be confined to sugar; yet the right is retained by the India Government, in case of necessity, to sell to them some other articles of India traffic, out of their stores, as also to charter their ships for the benefit of the country, either to cruise or make voyages in India, or to carry produce to this Republic, according to what said Government may deem most beneficial and advisable for the good of the country, and the agreements they may be able to make with the individual traders.—That the inhabitants of this Republic shall be allowed to carry on the same local commerce and navigation within the limits aforesaid as are or will be allowed to the inhabitants of the possessions of the Republic settled there, subject always to the laws and regulations existing there, and more especially to the duties on import and export.—That, in order to encourage trade, no duties whatever of export shall be levied on such ships as shall clear out for this Republic direct, from any of its possessions in Bengal, and on the Coast of Coromandel and Malabar.—That the ships shall be obliged to return to the ports of this Republic, and not be perceived to carry or to sell their cargoes, nor to break bulk elsewhere, on forfeiture of ship and cargo, or the value thereof to be recovered here from the owners.—That, in proportion to the tonnage, the ships shall be obliged to carry out to the settlements of this Republic a certain number of troops destined for the land and sea service in those quarters, the amount of passage money remaining to be determined.—The Government orders that the present shall be made public, and enjoins all those whom it concerns to conform strictly to the contents.—Hague, March 1, 1803.—By order of the Government, *J. Spoor*, President.—*C. G. Hultman*.

DOMESTIC.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES.

Thursday, March 10.—**LORDS.**—Lord Hobart brought down a Message from his Majesty relative to embodying the militia, for which see Commons.

COMMONS.—Report from the Committee on the Irish Duty Bill read and agreed to.—Irish Stamp, Hat, Postage, and Game Bills, read a third time and passed.—Mr. Addington brought down the following

MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY.

G. R. In consequence of the preparations carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, whilst important discussions are subsisting between his Majesty and the French Government, his Majesty thinks it due to the care and concern which he feels for his faithful people, to omit no means in his power which may contribute to their security.—In pursuance therefore of the Acts of Parliament enabling his Majesty to call out and assemble the militia of the United Kingdom, his

Majesty has thought it right to make this communication to the House of Commons, to the end that his Majesty may cause the said militia, or such part thereof as his Majesty shall think necessary, to be forthwith drawn out and embodied, and to march as occasion shall require.—*G. R.*

Friday, March 11.—**LORDS.**—Mutiny Bill went through a Committee of the whole House.—Vexatious Arrests Bill read a second time.—Accounts of the Irish Bank Notes in circulation in the years 1798, 1801, and 2, were presented.

COMMONS.—A petition was presented from Lord Gwydir and others against the Surrey Iron Railway.—Irish Chalking Bill read a third time and passed.—On the motion “that 10,000 seamen be added to the number now existing a debate of considerable length ensued, which will be preserved in *Sup. to Vol. 3*. The speakers were Messrs. Serjeant, Francis, Addington, Dent, Fox, Burroughs, Lord Hawkesbury, Messrs. Elliot, Canning, Pulteney, Trench, and Thornton. The question was then put and passed *nem. con.*—The Committee appointed to try the merits of petitions complaining of an undue election for the city of Coventry reported “that they had judged F. W. Barlow duly elected, and that N. Jefferys was disqualified by virtue of an act to secure the freedom of elections; but that neither the petitions nor the opposition to them were frivolous and vexatious.”—Mr. Tierney then moved, “that the Speaker do issue a new writ for Coventry.”

Monday, March 14.—**LORDS.**—On the second reading of the Prince of Wales’ Annuity Bill, a short debate ensued between Lords Pelham, Moira, Carlisle, Darnley, Suffolk, Carnarvon, and the Duke of Norfolk, which will be found in our *Supplement*.

COMMONS.—Kensington Paving Bill read a third time and passed.—Mr. Byng brought in a Bill for the augmentation of the salary of Coroners, read a first time.—Mr. Honocks moved, “that an account be laid before the House of the quantity of cotton wool and cotton twist exported from this country between 1790 and 1802.” Ordered.—Mr. York moved, “that there be laid before the House an estimate of the charges attending the pay and clothing of the militia.” Ordered.—On the motion of Mr. Sheridan, the lists of the freeholders, the validity of whose votes was questioned in the election for the county of Middlesex, were ordered to be served by the 1st of May.—Surrey Iron Railway read a second time.—Mr. Vansittart presented certain accounts relative to the lottery.—Lord Castlereagh moved the order of the day for going into a Committee on the accounts presented relative to the affairs of the East-India Company. The debate which ensued, together with a correct statement of the present situation of the finances of the Company, will be given in our *Supplement* to the present volume. The speakers were Lord Castlereagh, Messrs. Johnson, Addington, Francis, W. Dundas, Baring, and Metcalf. Question put and carried.—Report of Irish Customs Bill and Irish Law Suits Bill read and agreed to.—A new writ ordered for the shire of Ayr, in the room of W. Fullarton, Esq. now one of the Commissioners for settling the Affairs of the Island of Trinidad.—Expiring Laws Bill passed through a Committee.

Tuesday, March 15.—**LORDS.**—On the order of the day being moved, for going into a Committee on the Prince of Wales’ Annuity Bill, a short debate ensued between Lords Carlisle, Pelham, and the Lord Chancellor. Lord Carlisle’s excellent speech upon this occasion, together with those of

the other two speakers will be given in our *Supplement*.—Bill passed the Committee.

From the London Gazette — St. James's, March 16.—The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood on S. Wathen, Esq. High Sheriff for the County of Gloucester.

Whitehall, March 19.—The King has been pleased to grant to the Rev. M. Surtees, Clerk, Master of Arts, the place and dignity of a Canon or Prebendary of the Metropolitcal Church of Canterbury, void by the death of the Rev. J. Barton, late Canon thereof.

The King has also been pleased to present the Rev. Caleb Rockett, Clerk, Bachelor of Arts, to the Vicarage of Stockingham, otherwise Stokenham, in the County of Devon, and Diocese of Exeter.

Downing-Street, March 22.—By Dispatches received this morning from the Earl of Elgin, his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary at Constantinople, dated January 15, 1803, it appears, that the differences which had subsisted between the Sublime Porte and the Beys of Egypt, have been satisfactorily arranged through the mediation of his Majesty's Ambassador.

Whitehall, March 22.—The King has been pleased to present the Rev. J. Hawtrey, Clerk, Master of Arts, to the place and dignity of a Canon or Prebendary of the Cathedral Church of Winchester, void by the Promotion of Dr. G. Pelham, late Prebendary thereof, to the See of Bristol.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

WEST-INDIES.—ST. DOMINGO.—From the signature of the preliminaries of peace to the present hour, we have not ceased to represent to our readers the great and imminent danger which must inevitably arise to our West India colonies from the establishment of a considerable French force in the island of St. Domingo. The last intelligence from this grand deposit of troops pretty fully confirms our opinions, as to the result of the contest between the blacks and the whites. We will give this intelligence in the words of the ministerial paper, the *True Briton*, of the 22d instant.—“Accounts of a recent date were yesterday received from St. Domingo by the Jamaica mail. These represent the state of that colony as much more favourable than it has ever been since the first landing of the French. For the violence, injustice, and folly of Leclerc, General Rochambeau has substituted conciliatory conduct, moderation and good faith, and the consequence is, that though bands of brigands still exist, the rancorous spirit which prevailed has entirely subsided. He had issued a proclamation, inviting the negroes to return to the estates of their proprietors, and promising an amnesty, in consequence of which many had actually returned.—There can be no doubt, but that, if General Rochambeau had at first been sent with the chief command, the recovery of St. Domingo would have been easy.—When

“these accounts left St. Domingo for Jamaica, a three-decker, and some other vessels had hove in sight, supposed to be a squadron with reinforcements from France.”—So! away go, then, all the thousand and one tales, heretofore received through Jamaica and the United States; and, if the ministers had any sense of shame remaining, how could they hold up their heads after the accounts, which were said to be almost official, and which, in the month of December last, represented that the French army had, in part, gone over to the blacks, and that the rest, consisting of 1,500 men, who, together with their general, had actually evacuated and abandoned St. Domingo! Let it be observed, too, that they have constantly magnified the danger of the French enterprize in that island. They took delight in regarding it as one of those Herculean labours, which would occupy the Consul and divert his attention from England and her possessions; but now, behold, they have discovered the truth of what we always asserted, that the task was a very easy one. “There can be no doubt, but that, if General Rochambeau had at first been sent with the chief command, the recovery of St. Domingo would have been very easy!” And, how did we know, or how did they know, that General Rochambeau would not be sent with the chief command? When they gave their consent, or rather when the Consul extorted that consent; when they, long before the treaty of peace was signed, recalled our gallant fleet, and opened a free passage for our enemies to sail out with an armament almost unexampled in magnitude; when they did this, how did they know that General Rochambeau would not be the commander in chief, or that Leclerc would act with that violence, injustice, and folly, which they now (falsely we believe) impute to him? What could possibly encourage them to hope, that the French would send out such generals as our humane Williamson, and our more humane Maitland, to expend twenty millions of money merely for the philanthropic purpose of preventing the effusion of blood?—Troops had been constantly arriving at St. Domingo for some months before the last intelligence came away; and, from the be-

* See Register, Vol. II. p. 765 and 766.—True Briton, 3d and 4th of December, 1802, where it will be seen, that the accounts here spoken of were stated to have been received through the channel of government.—Never was a system of deception so unremittingly pursued as by these modest and conscientious minister.—There is no one trick which has not been played off for the purpose of deceiving the people, and of reconciling them to the disgraceful peace of Amiens.

means which we have of ascertaining the present strength of the French army there, we are persuaded it must consist of about 40,000 Europeans, including the troops who lately sailed from Italy and France. When the blacks are subdued, and ten or fifteen thousand of them are added to this European army, we would be glad to learn from Mr. Addington or Lord Hobart, what there is, except the interference of Divine Providence, to prevent our enemy from *seizing on Jamaica*; and, if Jamaica falls, the fate of the whole Western Archipelago is at once decided. The dread of this event has haunted our minds ever since the French expedition first sailed, and it certainly requires a head and a heart like Mr. Addington's to keep a man happy in spite of such danger.—How very different would our situation have been at this moment, had not the “safe politicians” permitted the French force to sail, *till after the ratification of the definitive treaty*, in which case the landing would have taken place in June instead of January, 1802; in the sickly season instead of the healthy one; Toussaint would have had six months to prepare, instead of being taken totally by surprise; it would have required 200,000 troops, instead of 50,000, to recover the colony; the war would have lasted years instead of months; it would have been, indeed, an Herculean labour for the French, it would have formed a most important diversion, and would, most assuredly, have prevented, or, at least, considerably retarded, the alarming crisis which has now arrived, and which has plunged this country into every species of embarrassment. To *preserve Jamaica*, however, is now the principal object in that quarter of the world; and, to do this, 10,000 troops should instantly be sent out, under an active, a brave, and zealous commander. This force, together with what there already is, and what may be collected, in the island, might defend that precious gem of the British crown; but that, without such a force, it will be rifled and destroyed, we most sincerely believe! Our fleet alone, however faithful, vigilant, and powerful, is not, alone, sufficient for the protection of Jamaica. Six hours fair wind brings the enemy to land; and the point of landing is entirely at his choice. If, therefore, war is the result of the present armament, *immediate* defence must be provided; and, if this non-descript state of things continue for awhile longer, an addition to the forces on the island should be made as soon as possible. The object of France will not be to *preserve*, but to *destroy*. The moment she is ready, Jamaica will, for that diabolical

purpose, be invaded; and, therefore, the country must make up its mind to lose this invaluable colony, or to defend it by a military and naval force *nearly equal to the whole of our last peace establishment!* Such is the “security to our colonies,” which Lord Castlereagh* promised us from the peace of Amiens generally, and especially from the wise measure of permitting the French armament to sail previous to the conclusion of the definitive treaty. During the last peace, one fifty gun ship and a few frigates composed the whole of our naval force on the Jamaica station; we have now, on that same station, 10 ships of the line, six frigates, and 6 sloops of war, making in the whole 22 vessels of war; whereas, *previous to the signing of the preliminaries*, we had, on this station, only 6 ships of the line, 4 frigates, and 5 sloops of war! And yet this was to be a “peace of security;” a peace for the “husbanding of our resources!”

LOUISIANA.—Of this colony, and of the danger which will inevitably arise to this country from its occupation by France, we have said so much, that any further endeavours in that way, will, we fear, be totally useless. It is, however, our duty to continue to submit to the public what we know and think upon the subject. The American government has pursued precisely the course, which we said it would pursue. It has not yielded to the momentary feelings of the people. New Orleans has not been attacked, as some persons expected it would, by the western settlers, who, though their flour has fallen in value from *five dollars and a half per barrel* to *one dollar per barrel*, are patiently waiting for the result of the mission of Mr. Munro, a person famous for his love of France and his hatred of England, who has been dispatched by the President, to *negotiate* on the subject with the court of Spain in the first instance, and, if he fail there, with the Consul of France. How such a negotiation, conducted by such a person, is likely to terminate, it is by no means difficult to foresee, especially when we recollect, that the French armament destined for Louisiana *is now embarked*†, and will, in all likelihood have taken possession of New Orleans, before Mr. Munro will have delivered his credentials at Madrid.—The measures, which the French will be likely to adopt, with regard to this colony, as well as the fearful consequences which must arise therefrom to England, are fully pointed out in a letter to Lord Hawkesbury, to which we beg leave to refer our readers‡.

* See Parl. Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1335.

† Since the above was written, it seems the troops have disembarked.—‡ Vol. III. p. 397.

and by which we think they will be convinced, that immediate steps ought to be taken to frustrate the views of France in this respect. The armament should *be prevented from sailing*. "But this is war!" War! aye; and what are we arming for, if not for war? Besides, are we not, or *were* we not, holding the Cape of Good Hope, even when the provocation or danger, was not sufficient to produce, or, at least, *did not produce*, an armament in our ports; and, shall we, now that an armament has been thought necessary, not be justified in preventing the departure of the fleets and armies of our enemy? But, "the Message?" Yes, the Message does, indeed, intimate, that, if the thousands upon thousands of troops, with which Buonaparté has lined the opposite coast, are destined for "colonial service," then all is right; then there is no hostility to be apprehended; and, of course, it would be a flagrant act of aggression, on our part, to prevent *the sailing* of those troops; for, until we can ascertain their destination, which we cannot while they are in port, it is absolutely impossible for us to ascertain, that they are *not* intended for colonial service. So that, according to this notion, we must either send a squadron to accompany each detachment to the French colonies, and see it safely landed, or run the risk of seeing the whole of them land in our own dominions, at home or abroad! Such an idea never before entered the mind even of a maniac. It is a symptom of idiotism such as was never yet heard of.—If this armament is suffered to sail for Louisiana, it may chance to land in Ireland, and we have no hesitation to say, that it would, in that case, be much less dangerous to the interests of the kingdom. In Ireland, it might, and, we trust, it would, be defeated; but, if it obtains a fast footing in Louisiana, and six months of peace, or of nominal peace, follow, it strikes a blow, which this country cannot long survive.—This prediction we have repeated over and over so often, that we have no apology to offer but the magnitude of the evil which we dread, and which we again call upon the ministers to avert, while yet it is in their power, or to prepare themselves for the execrations of a ruined and enslaved people.

THE TURKISH EMPIRE appears to be, in some sort, taken possession of by the French. French Engineers, *alias* Commercial Agents, have been stationed in all the sea ports, and, indeed, in all other places of defence. Divers rumours are afloat as to the particular acts of encroachment, which the Consul has in view; but none of these acts seem to be decidedly fixed, and we will

venture to say, that they cannot, without the concurrence of Russia. The most probable conjecture is, that France will make use of all her power and her policy to obtain the re-possession of Egypt, in which object, *maugre* the arrangement, made through the mediation of Lord Elgin, we are fully persuaded she will succeed, upon condition of winking at an equivalent acquirement, on the part of Russia. The fate, then, of Turkey, and, eventually of India, will depend, as far, at least, as present appearances allow us to calculate, on the disposition of Russia. If that power is, as we formerly observed, under the guidance of ambition, if her projects with respect to Persia and India are revived, our Empire in the East must be placed in an uncertain, not to say a dangerous situation, especially when we recollect that Cochin and the Cape of Good Hope are at the command of the French, to which latter place the armament under Decaen and Linois is certainly gone.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.—From every thing we have been able to learn, on the subject, and we can venture to state, that our information is tolerably correct, this most important of the outworks of India is, at this moment, completely surrendered and evacuated by us, in consequence of orders sent out since the date of those by which General Dundas was authorized to retain it. The capitulation by which this retention was effected is without a precedent in the history of the world*. Nothing like it, or bearing any resemblance to it, was ever before known, thought of, or dreamt of.—As to our *right* to retain the Cape, beyond the time stipulated for its delivery to the Dutch, or even for ever, no doubt can possibly exist in the mind of any one, who does not, with the honest Talleyrand and his master, regard the treaty of Amiens as having abrogated, with respect to this country, all the maxims of the law of nature as well as of nations. That the ministers of Great-Britain have tacitly acknowledged this unjust, this degrading, this monstrous principle, we, with shame, confess; but, it does not follow, that it has been, or that it will be, acknowledged by the nation, which cannot, in this unlimited sense, renounce its natural rights, rights necessary to its existence as a nation, without violating its duty to the world, a duty paramount to all those which it can possibly owe to any particular nation. The doctrine, therefore, which has been inculcated by those London editors who are supposed to speak the sentiments of Mr.

* Capitulation in our neck.

Fox and Mr. Sheridan, is not less unfounded in itself than it is pernicious in its tendency. Mr. Fox has, indeed, spoken for himself: he has declared, that, "*whatever may have happened since the signing of the treaty of Amiens, it is our duty to fulfil, on our part, every stipulation of that treaty; but, after having done that,*" says he, "*if our honour demands it, let us go to war.*" Without stopping to ask how long it is since the honourable gentleman took up these "quixotic" notions, we shall endeavour to show, that they are quite inapplicable to the present case. All the writers on public law, reprobate, in the strongest terms, a wilful and unjust breach of a treaty of peace; but, they do not say, that there is *no cause* which can justify such breach. Not to take up the readers' time with authorities, to which we could here appeal, let us suppose, that France had invaded Jersey ten days after the treaty of Amiens was concluded, would any one, in that case, have had the assurance to insist, that, we were, notwithstanding this act of violence, still bound in good faith, to restore Martinico? This is certainly a strong case, but it serves to show, that the principle, in its unlimited unqualified sense, is a perfect absurdity. The true doctrine is, that, if, *between the conclusion and the fulfilment* of a treaty of peace, one of the contracting parties does any act which would *fully justify the other party in renewing the war*, that same act justifies the latter party in doing all things short of war, and, amongst these, is the retention of territories stipulated to be restored. This being admitted, as we think it must, who is there that will deny the fact of France having, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, done act upon act, which would have fully justified us in taking up arms against her? But, "we have overlooked these acts," says the Morning Post, "and, therefore, we cannot *now* plead them." This also is new doctrine. Exactly the contrary is true. Our having made the treaty of Amiens with the knowledge that our enemy had already obtained the possession of, or the mastery over, Elba, Louisiana, Piedmont, and the Italian Republic, does, indeed, preclude all complaint on those accounts, because, knowing of these encroachments at the time of making the treaty, we, by that treaty, gave our tacit consent to them. They would have formed a good ground for refusing to conclude the definitive treaty upon the basis of the preliminaries, but they form no justification for non-fulfilment of the definitive treaty. Not so, however, with regard to the subjugation of Switzer-

land and the new division of Germany, either of which formed a good and lawful plea for non-fulfilment, though not upon the principles of our "*safe politicians*," who, at every step, become more and more involved in inconsistency. "These acts of aggression, too, were overlooked." They were so; but, if there be now, or if there have been, any other act, sufficient to justify us in taking up arms, the acts abovementioned and other hostile acts, committed since the conclusion of the peace, *revive*, and are fairly and forcibly enumerated in justification of a war on our part, or in the retention of any thing ceded to France by the treaty.—With regard to the Cape of Good Hope, however, another difficulty is started. "It *was to Holland* and not to France that we *were to restore the Cape, and we cannot accuse Holland of any act of hostility.*" No; but we have as good a plea against the restitution of the Cape as we should have had if Holland had committed all the acts, of which France has been guilty. A treaty is an act of reciprocity, if there are three parties on one side, and one on the other, the *whole* of the three are, as to every thing connected with the fulfilment of the treaty, responsible for each, and each is responsible for the whole. It might have happened, that at the end of three months, one restoration was to be made by England to Holland; and, at the end of two months, one was to be made by France to England. If France refused to fulfil her part of the engagement, will any one contend that England ought nevertheless to fulfil hers, merely because the restoration was not to be made to France? But, there is another ground for retaining any one, or all of, the Dutch possessions; a ground, which existed from the hour the treaty was signed, which has become more and more solid from that hour to this, and which never ought to have been abandoned for one single moment. When a treaty is made, the parties are always understood to take into view not only their situation relative to each other, but the situation of each other relative to other powers. Any thing, therefore, which has an existence at the time of making the treaty, and which adds to the power of one of the parties, may, if unknown to the other party, be afterwards a just ground for non-fulfilment of the treaty on his part. Suppose that the French had, previous to the treaty of Amiens, obtained a cession of the island of Sardinia, and this had not been known to us till after the treaty was ratified, should we still have been obliged, in good faith, to evacuate Minorca and Elba? We imagine, that no one, except Mr. Fox, will attempt

to maintain the affirmative of this question. If, then, the disguising from a party a circumstance of this nature would justify the non-fulfilment of his share of the contract, and would, in fact, if he chose it, nullify the contract altogether, a less effect cannot be attributed to a failure, in one of the parties, to execute engagements which he is well known to have entered into with some other power, particularly if that power be a party to the treaty, and *if the fulfilment of those engagements is entirely to depend upon the conclusion of that treaty.* Now this is precisely the case before us. The French, in the year 1795, invaded Holland, and became masters of the country, to the annoyance and danger of Great Britain. The people became, in reality, the slaves of France; their pecuniary, military, and naval means became hers; but, as self-preservation was the pretext of the invader, it was agreed, in a public treaty, concluded between the Dutch and the French, that the latter should keep troops in the territories of Holland, "during the *present war only.*"—The words are these: "ARTICLE XVII. The French Republic shall continue to occupy such places and positions as are necessary for the *defence of the country*, but with a fixed number of troops, to be agreed on, and *during the present war only.*" * There are several other stipulations of this treaty, which were to be executed at the general peace, and which, if they had been so executed, would have contributed materially to change the situation of Holland, with respect to France and to England; but, not to confuse the question, we confine ourselves to that which we have here cited. When the treaty of Amiens came to be negotiated, England, of course, reckoned amongst its advantages that of delivering Holland from French troops, that of restoring to her some degree of independence, that of leaving her somewhat more free to follow her own will, that of returning, perhaps, in time, to her ancient relations with this kingdom, and, above all, that of withdrawing her sailors and her ships from the service of France, and of removing from ourselves the continual danger of a French invasion from her coasts. But, this stipulation not having been executed by France, the French troops still remaining in Holland, none of these great and important advantages, which were reckoned upon by

* XVII. La République Française continuera d'occuper militairement, mais par un nombre de troupes déterminé et convenu entre les deux nations, pendant la présente guerre seulement, les places et positions qu'il sera utile de garder pour la défense du pays.

England, in concluding the treaty of Amiens, and for which she made such immense sacrifices, have been, or are likely to be, obtained: on the contrary, Holland is more than ever under the power of Buonaparté; he lays her under contribution at his pleasure, makes her ships and sailors serve him as if they were his own, fits out his expeditions in her ports and at her expense, and has lined her coasts with troops evidently for the purpose of menacing or invading this country. With respect to Holland, therefore, he has violated a *positive*, and, with respect to us, a *tacit* convention, which, though not actually making a part of the treaty of Amiens, is nevertheless, in point of execution, to be considered as inseparable from it; and, as it ought to have been executed *immediately* after the treaty was concluded, the failure to execute it was the *first infraction* of that treaty, and, of course, fully justified not only the retention of the Cape, but of every other possession, which we had stipulated to restore.—Here, then, was clear, solid, and honourable ground, whereon for the ministers to make a stand against the assaults of the honest Talleyrand and the no less honest Mr. Fox. Nor is this ground at all impaired by lapse of time, or by the miserable ignorance, indecision, and pusillanimity of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies; for whatever be their faults, whatever their offences against the interest and honour of their royal master and their country (and, God knows, they are great enough!) none of these can be pleaded in justification of a breach of faith committed by France. We are aware, that these arguments, as applicable to the Cape of Good Hope, may have been rendered useless by the ministers, whose saying and unsaying, in this as well as in all other cases, bear no very feeble resemblance, whether in matter or in manner, to the faltering accents of an illiterate culprit; but, lest they should attempt to eke out their political existence by another disgraceful compromise, we think it right to deprive them beforehand of every pretence grounded upon a *want of matter to justify hostilities.*

MALTA.—As the infraction of a treaty, by one of the parties, may, if the other party chooses, render the whole compact null and void, England would, on this ground, be fully justified in the retention of Malta. But, she has other ground, whereon to justify that retention; and, with all due deference to Mr. Fox and the Morning Chronicle, we think it no difficult matter to prove, that, without pleading any of the other numerous infractions of the treaty of Amiens by France, *England is not, even according to*

that treaty, bound, under the present circumstances, to evacuate the island of Malta; that, the ministers in keeping possession of it, are guilty of no breach of public faith, but that, on the contrary, in giving it up, they would commit a crime against their country; and that, the retention is not to be regarded as "an indemnity for the unjust encroachments of the French government," as it has been represented by those men of "*English feeling*," who one minute cry out against the injustice, insolence, and tyranny of Buonaparté, and the next declare their readiness to make *new concessions* rather than resist this injustice, insolence, and tyranny by arms; we flatter ourselves, that we shall be able to prove, that the retention of Malta is not to be considered as an indemnity of this or of any sort, nor even as the first act of hostilities in the new and just war into which we are about to be driven, but purely and simply as the preservation of a thing which lawfully belongs to us.—By the treaty of Amiens, article X, it is agreed, as a basis, that "the islands of Malta, Gezo, and Comio, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, to be held on the same conditions, on which it possessed them *before the war*, and under the following stipulations."—These stipulations, which provide for a modification of the Order are contained in the clauses 1, 2, and 3*. They state, in substance, that the French Langues shall be suppressed, that a Maltese Langue shall be established, and that the Order shall be composed of the Langues which "shall continue to subsist after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty;" that is to say, of the same Langues that subsisted before the war, with the exception of these two alterations.—The Order, such as it ought to be for the purpose of receiving the sovereignty of Malta, Gezo, and Comio, is here, then, accurately described. It was not to the Order of St. John, generally, but to that Order constituted conformably to the treaty of Amiens, that we were bound to surrender the sovereignty and the territory of Malta. Whether the Order thus constituted would, or would not, be capable of maintaining its independence, is a question which has nothing to do with that now before us. We have no right to plead the ignorance and selfishness of our ministers as a ground for the non-fulfilment of a treaty that they have made; but, if the Order, such as it is described and specified in the treaty, has undergone any material change, and, particularly if that change tends to weaken it, and has, moreover, been produced by any

* See the treaty, Register, Vol. I. p. 323.

power or powers, other than ourselves, who were parties to the treaty, it is evident that we are not bound to surrender the island, of which we possess both the dominion and the sovereignty, into the hands of the Order thus mutilated; because, in so doing, we should surrender it to a sovereign, who is not the sovereign designated by the treaty to receive it.—If the reader allows these premises to be just, a simple narrative of facts is all that is wanted to make out our position.—Before the epoch fixed on for the surrender of the island (see Art. X. clause 4,) the Order of Malta, which, according to the terms of the treaty was to consist of the Langues of Italy, Castille, Arragon, Germany, and Bavaria, was materially curtailed and enfeebled by the suppression of the Langues of Castille and Arragon, and this suppression was made by the King of Spain, the ally of France, one of the parties to the treaty. More recently the Langue of Bavaria has been suppressed, and also that part of the Italian Langue comprised in Piedmont and the Duchy of Parma, now united to France (another of the parties to the treaty of Amiens), thus reducing the Order to a skeleton, rendering its sovereignty and independence a mere mockery, and preserving its name only for the purpose of enforcing the stipulation by which we have agreed to evacuate the island. That such must have been the effect of these suppressions no one will deny, and, it follows of course, that we are absolved from our obligation relative to the surrender; for, the object of the two principal contracting parties respecting Malta is, in the 2d clause of Art. X. clearly declared to be, "to place the *Order and Island of Malta* in a state of entire *independence* with regard to themselves." The subsequent stipulations turn almost wholly and entirely upon the manner of effectually providing for this independence, in speaking of which the *Order* and the *Island* are never separated. Every thing indicates, that the Order was, in itself, even previous to the amputations it has undergone since the treaty, considered as insufficient for this purpose, and, for that reason, a foreign garrison is provided together with the guarantee of the six principal powers of Europe. Any change, therefore, tending further to enfeeble the Order, and absolutely to destroy the means already looked upon as insufficient, must, unless England has occasioned such change, fully acquit her of a breach of faith in retaining the island, and, we hardly think that Mr. Barrère, or even Mr. Fox, will attempt to prove, that this country has forced Spain, Bavaria, and France to make those suppressions, by which the Order is reduced to a hundred

knights, almost destitute of revenues, and no more able to defend Malta than they are to conquer the Empire of Russia. Since, therefore, the Sovereign, to whom Malta was to be surrendered, not only no longer exists, but has been mutilated and destroyed by the opposite parties to the treaty of Amiens, England has not only a *right* to retain the dominion and sovereignty of the island, but such retention is a *duty* which she owes to Europe in general, and to the people of Malta in particular, whom she is bound, by obligations the most sacred, not to surrender to, or leave at the mercy of, any foreign power whatever.

PUBLIC CREDIT.—While the retention of the places, of which we have spoken above, is fully justified by the conduct of the enemy, we imagine it will be very difficult for the ministers to justify themselves to the nation for the contradictory orders they have given in this respect, and for the blow which their selfishness has finally given to the credit of the country. The *Imogen*, which took out the orders for the retention of the Cape, must have sailed from England late in October. On the 10th of December Mr. Addington came to the parliament with his grand financial display, in which he presented an estimate explicitly founded upon a *reduction of our establishments during the present year* *. Just before the Christmas recess, in the debate upon the Navy Commissioners Bill, to which Lord Folkestone objected, as unhinging the naval service at a moment when war might be expected, the *candid* Chancellor of the Exchequer replied, with his usual modesty, that "whatever *ill-boding opinions* his lordship might entertain, he was sure *the House would not adopt them*." And, no longer ago than the 18th of February, only four days previous to the delivery of the King's Message, he offered, as a reason for voting the money to the Prince of Wales, that *we were now in a state of peace*. If, therefore, orders had not, between the sailing of the *Imogen* and the 10th of December, been sent to evacuate the Cape, on what did Mr. Addington found those hopes, which he held out to the country on the latter day, of a reduction of our establishments? And, if the Cape be now delivered up, how will he answer to his country for having surrendered that important place, when we had an undoubted right to retain it, and for having thus, on the eve of a war, put one of the keys of India into the enemy's hands? But, his subsequent conduct it will be still more difficult to justify. Did he know nothing of the hostile disposition

and preparations of France on the 18th of February? Was the present armament resolved on and the Message delivered to Parliament in fourteen days from the first moment of his having obtained any knowledge of the circumstances that led to that important measure? No longer ago than the 18th of February, he must have been totally ignorant of all the grounds of alarm, or, his declaration of that day, must have been intended to deceive the holders of stock. Let him, therefore, take his choice between the *profoundest ignorance* or the *profoundest duplicity*.—Whatever may have been the motive of his conduct, the effect is certain; he has depreciated, not the *funds*, but the *credit* of the country. However men may differ in other respects, they all agree, that he will never be able to make another loan under *twenty* per cent. No monied man will ever again place confidence in his assertions or his estimates, both of which have proved to be shamefully fallacious; and, which is still worse, his bad faith will be entailed upon his successors, as the bankruptcy of a partner never fails to bring lasting discredit upon the firm. For this reason, if for no other, the *candid* minister must yield his place in "*the machine*." It will require no intrigue, no force, to put him out; out he must come, or the machine will first stop, then crumble into dust.

SIR THOMAS TROUBRIDGE—Connected with the foregoing subject is the conduct of a certain person *in office* with regard to *the stocks*. The imputation has been publicly made, and has not been removed, that persons have profited from the information, derived from their official situation, and have dealt in the funds to a very great amount. Certain it is, that there never was known so material an anticipation. To what cause it was to be ascribed we cannot say, but we know that the suspicions of the people in the city are not to be done away, without something more satisfactory than the whining nonsense, which the news-papers have published on the subject.—On the *Richmond-Park* ministry, no blame can certainly attach; those three words must always awaken ideas of purity, sanctity, and, particularly, of fair-dealing; and, it was with no less astonishment than regret, that we saw Capt. Markham bring forward the story relative to Sir Thomas Troubridge, who, besides his being of the *Shelburne* school, and belonging to the *Richmond-Park* ministry, has a character for bravery quite sufficient to shelter him from the malignant insinuations of the losers in *'Change Alley*—We have read the letter of Sir Thomas's agent, and have heard Captain Markham read the affidavit of the same person, to both which documents we,

* See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 784.

of course, give implicit credit, and we must, therefore, regard Sir Thomas as completely cleared; but yet, for this brave gentleman's own sake, as well as for that of the service, to which he has the honour to belong, we could have wished, that the *power of attorney*, in virtue of which the stock was sold, had been produced. This instrument, we are told, still exists, and, as its *date* will, at once, put the matter to rest, we do wish that Sir Thomas, or some one of his friends, would move for its production. It was extremely unfortunate, too, that Captain Markham did not provide some one to *second his motion for an inquiry*. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, worthy soul! did, indeed, most ably support all that Captain Markham had advanced, but the good man, in giving way to the warmth of his friendship, forgot the routine part of the business, and actually sat down after having seconded every thing but the motion! This omission was, too, the more untoward, when the fate of Sir William Elford's motion and the Admiralty comments thereon were recollected. Sir William's motion, which was for an inquiry into the conduct of Mr. Marshall of Plymouth, *was not seconded*; and this was regarded by the Admiralty and the newspapers as *a proof of his guilt*. Far be it from us to to apply this mode of judging to Sir Thomas Troubridge; but, we cannot help lamenting, that the motion was not seconded.—We shall return to this subject another time, for we are extremely anxious, that not a shadow of suspicion should remain. For our own parts we are perfectly satisfied; but we again beg leave to recommend, that the public may be informed of the *date* of the *power of attorney*. If it shall appear, as we doubt not it will, that this instrument was signed, *before* the armament was resolved on in Council, or even before the Lords of the Admiralty had any intimation of it, then will the base calumniators be silenced, which we are much afraid they will not by any other means.

MILITIA.—A bill is now laid before the House of Commons for the purpose of "more speedily and effectually completing the establishment of officers in the militia of Great Britain."—As the debates on this bill have given rise to some very malignant insinuations in the Morning Post of Thursday last, as well as to some *gallery clap-traps* elsewhere, we think ourselves called upon to make a few remarks on the subject; not so much, however, for the purpose of showing the evil tendency of the measure as for that of exposing the inconsistency of those who are endeavouring to throw an unmerited odium on the gentlemen, by whom it has been opposed, and through whose means

a considerable modification of it has been obtained.—The ministers, conscious of deserving the severe reproaches of the country, for the whole of their conduct at, and since, the peace, but particularly for that part of it, which relates to their disarming, disembodiment, disbanding, and dismantling system, by which they thought to have secured the never-ending applauses of the ignorant multitude, are now seeking for occasions to stifle those reproaches in their birth, by accusing their opponents of a desire to retard the restoration of the army and the navy. The measures they have brought forward relative to the militia both in Great Britain and in Ireland, are, to say the least of them, of a tendency extremely injurious to the military service of the kingdom; but, every objection made to these measures, every fear or doubt with regard to their effect, and, indeed, every suggestion, however, mildly and amicably offered, not implicitly coinciding with the projects of men, whose ignorance is universally admitted, is met by the imputation of a wish to *dishearten* the people and to *obstruct* the measures *necessary for national defence*.—This excellent mode of obviating the inconveniences of discussion has been tried to its utmost, on the present occasion, with what degree of truth and of justice we shall, in a few words, endeavour to enable our readers to judge.—The bill in question enables persons, not having qualifications of landed or pecuniary property, to be officers of militia. There are various modifications as to the rank, manner of admission, &c. &c. but this is the regulation simply stated, *it does enable unqualified persons to be officers in the militia service of England*. Lord Folkestone objected to it, principally upon the ground, that it tended to keep the nobility and gentry out of the militia, and, at the same time, to injure, in various ways, the regular service. This was immediately laid hold of by the Secretary at War, who expressed his *astonishment* at what had fallen from the noble Lord, and also by Mr. Sheridan, who observed, that the young nobility and gentry would do better to go into the militia than to *follow their bounds*. This brilliant sally, which caught "*a loud cry of hear! hear!*" was not, to say the truth, much to the point, and his Lordship might certainly have observed, that the sports of the field were full as wholesome and as honourable, full as likely to strengthen the frame and ennoble the mind, as the various pleasures of the theatre or the gaming-house. To the astonishment of the Secretary at War, who brought in the bill, his Lordship had still a better reply; to wit; that the bill, then before the House, was, as far as it went, in direct contradic-

tion to the complete code of militia law, which was passed by the parliament no longer ago than the 26th of June last, and which was framed and brought forward by the Secretary at War himself! That code, which fills up nearly a *hundred pages* of the statute-book, begins with these words: "Whereas a respectable military force, under the *command of officers* POSSESSING LANDED PROPERTY, within Great Britain, is *essential to the constitution*." It then proceeds to state, that great disorder and innovation have crept into the militia system; after which it enumerates the several militia acts in existence, and repeals them all, for the purpose of substituting a well-digested permanent code, the very basis of which is, that *every commissioned officer shall have a qualification in property*. What gentleman, then, especially a gentleman who had assisted in passing this "well-digested permanent code," could be expected to give, without hesitation, his consent to a bill, which struck at the very foundation of it? And, with what degree of consistency, of common respect, or of common decency, could he be reproached for that hesitation, by the very person, who, only eight months ago, had digested, drawn up, and procured to be passed, that permanent code? "But, the necessity of the times!" The necessity of the times may be great, but, with regard to the militia, it merely *calls them out*, and, if the "well-digested permanent code" be insufficient for that purpose, what is the use of it? Why does it swell out the statute book? Why were some hundreds of pounds expended in the printing of it? And why were the two Houses of the last Parliament compelled to waste upon it so many of those hours, which might otherwise have been devoted to the diverting speeches of Mr. Sheridan or to the bills about "pigeons' and rabbits' dung *?" This code makes a fine figure in the rolls of Parliament, and in the printing-office of Mr. Strahan; but the moment it is to be acted upon, away it goes, and all the "landed property," and "the constitution" along with it. It was, it seems, a thing merely for show, like feathers, or grenadier caps, or any other of those baubles, which the soldiers describe as being "all for *sight* and none for *fight*," and which are always thrown aside preparatory to a battle.—The Secretary of War, aware of the force of these arguments, attempted to meet them by a *precedent*. He reminded Lord Folkestone, that the very same measure was adopted *during the last war*. "Yes," his Lordship might have said, "and

* For sweeping the House of Parliament of some of these documents of peddling and dirty legislation, the country is indebted to Lord Holland.

"this very same measure it was, which your code was principally intended to *prevent in future!*" But, besides this, the precedent was by no means in point. During the war, the men of the militia were suddenly *doubled in number*, which created an absolute necessity of admitting unqualified officers; whereas no augmentation of the militia has now taken place; its strength is as it was fixed by the "well-digested permanent code." The precedent was, therefore, totally inapplicable to the case, and the objections of Lord Folkestone still remain to be answered by something better than a cry of "*disheartening the people*," by which cry, we trust, his Lordship is not to be deterred from a discharge of that duty, which demands a strict examination into every measure proposed by those men, whose inconsistent and wavering conduct has, even according to their own acknowledgment, already brought their country into imminent danger, and who have the modesty to plead that very danger as a title to unlimited confidence.

CREATING DESPONDENCY.—This is the charge, which the ministry now prefer against all those, who attempt to awaken the country to a sense of its danger. Their object is evident enough; for, if the danger of the country be so great as we, for instance, affirm it is, the fault must be in the ministers, and, therefore, it is very natural for them to decry every thing tending to establish our position. The nation, too, has a feeling of somewhat the same sort: it is conscious of having, in some degree, participated in the measure, which has so speedily brought it to the brink of destruction, and to the dreadful effects of which it would fain shut its eyes. Thus both the ministry and the people have adopted the sentiments and the language of the perverse and degenerate Israelites; "they say to the seers, see not; and to the prophets, prophesy not unto us right things; speak unto us *smooth things*, prophesy *deceits*." This folly and timidity are represented by the prophet Isaiah as a symptom of that baseness, which was to produce, and which finally did produce, first the captivity and afterwards the dispersion of the Jewish nation; and, in spite of the cuckoo cry of "*creating despondency*," we give it as our settled opinion, that, unless a very important and speedy change takes place in this kingdom, the Jews will not be the only people without a country.—"If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch." It has always been our maxim, that the country cannot be saved, without being fully apprized of all the dangers of its situation, and of all the difficulties it has to encounter. This maxim

we laid down at the very outset of those labours which, since the signature of the preliminaries, we have so unremittingly pursued:—"It requires no very great degree of penetration to discover, that your Lordship would gladly draw a veil over these scandalous occurrences; nor should I have much objection to follow your example, were I not well persuaded, that every attempt to disguise our situation will only tend to accelerate the consummation of our ruin." *—Despondency, indeed!—Are we the people that despond? We, who would have continued the war, and who weekly repeat our opinion that it ought immediately to be renewed, as the only means of regaining the confidence of the world? We do not doubt of the means but of the will of the nation. Our apprehensions are not positive but conditional: if the government and the people will do what they are able, we triumph; if they will not, we sink, we become the slaves of France, and our very name is blotted out. Do we create despondency, then, or do we animate to exertion and to patriotic sacrifices? "Aye, there's the rub!" We call for exertion and for sacrifices; and, therefore, it is that we create despondency in the minds of all those, who, to the making of that exertion and those sacrifices, prefer the "sounding brass and tinkling cymbal" of Mr. Sheridan's speeches.—But we "expose the weakness of the country." On the contrary, we say it is yet strong; that it yet possesses the means not of paltry cowardly defensive, but of offensive war. We cease not to urge, that "another war, a successful war against France," is the means, and the only means, of recovering our lost reputation, and of reviving that confidence in our military and naval strength, which is absolutely necessary to our pecuniary credit. This charge of "exposing the weakness of the country" is a most convenient subterfuge for the ministers and their timid followers. It is not the weakness of the country, but their weakness, or wickedness, which we expose. We have said, and we say even now, that there are not six ships of the line fit for sea; but, do we thereby say, or insinuate, that the country is unable to put out more, and that there might not have been fifty ready for sea, under Lords Chatham or Spencer? We accuse Mr. Addington of deceiving, grossly and shamefully deceiving the nation, in promising to have "fifty ships of the line ready, in a month, in case

* Letters to Lord Hawkesbury, p. 4.

of emergency," when he cannot now say, after a month of preparation, that he has six ready for sea. That this emergency exists no one can doubt, because the militia is called out, and the law says, that it shall not be called out, except in case of internal commotion, or of invasion, or imminent danger of invasion. There is no internal commotion, therefore his Majesty's ministers tell the country that there is imminent danger of invasion: this is a case of emergency; and, shall we, because we expose the ignorance, or the duplicity of the minister, be accused of exposing the weakness of the country? If so, the silence and forbearance of a political writer must ever bear a direct proportion to the magnitude of the mischief to be apprehended from the measures of the government! A doctrine too monstrously absurd to be maintained even by the candid tribe, who are attempting to support the present crazy and destructive "machine." "The Morning Post of Thursday last says: "The disheartening picture Mr. Windham daily draws of the situation of this country, may encourage the French to make war." As if the French did not know the situation of the country! But, let us now hear the "consolatory language of this same paper:"—"If the time for such a struggle [a struggle between France and England] should arrive, England must defend herself by REVOLUTIONARY MEANS, like those to which France resorted when she was attacked by all Europe. The purse and the person of every man in France are within the grasp of the present French Government, and it is only by the uncontrolled use of them that Buonaparté can effect his purposes. Should England be seriously threatened with invasion, our own government must be invested with the same powers!!!!" And this is the language of consolation! This is the opinion of that paper, which reviles Mr. Windham for "disheartening the country!"—We must close.—We leave the reader to make a comparison between our sentiments and those of this high-spirited print.

NOTICES.

* * We have just received, from the QUEEN'S GERMAN REGIMENT an OFFICIAL DOCUMENT, which, when published, as it will be in the Register of next week, will completely remove the insinuations thrown out by the commentators on the statements of the 42d Regiment, and will, also, we think, fully prove, that the INVINCIBLE STANDARD was, never, for one moment, in the possession of the Highlanders.—X. in our next.